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COMPLEX ADAPTIVE PEACEMAKING: HOW SYSTEMS
THEORY REVEALS ADVANTAGES OF TRADITIONAL
TRIBAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS
Juliana E. Okulski 1
INTRODUCTION
Many contemporary tribal communities have two distinct
justice systems capable of resolving interpersonal civil disputes
among tribal members. 2 The systems are grounded in different
justice paradigms, and as a result utilize very different procedures
for dispute resolution. One system is based on the Western, or
Anglo-American, paradigm of justice and resolves conflict through
litigation or other adversarial dispute resolution methods. 3 For
example, Indian tribal courts, which were modeled largely on
American courts, historically have resolved disputes by employing
some degree of the Western adversarial ideals of justice. 4 The
Western paradigm of justice prioritizes and seeks to protect
individual rights above all else. More recently, however, many
tribes have rediscovered or formally instituted traditional tribal
methods of dispute resolution, generally referred to as
“peacemaking,” 5 and are now also resolving interpersonal civil
disputes pursuant to traditional tribal justice principles as well. 6
The “tribal peacemaking” concept has been defined as “any system
of dispute resolution used within a Native American community
which utilizes non-adversarial strategies . . . [and] incorporates
some traditional or customary approaches . . . the aim of which is

1

University of Denver Sturm College of Law, J.D. expected May, 2016. The
author wishes to thank Troy Eid and Jan G. Laitos for their assistance in
reviewing this article.
2
Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary
Analysis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 502 (2002).
3
Id.
4
Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking:
How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 237 (1997).
5
William C. Bradford, Reclaiming Indigenous Legal Autonomy on the Path to
Peaceful Coexistence: The Theory, Practice, and Limitations of Tribal
Peacemaking in Indian Dispute Resolution, 76 N.D. L. REV. 551, 578-79 (2000);
Porter, supra note 4, at 250-51.
6
Bradford, supra note 4, at 577-78.
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conciliation and restoration of peace and harmony.” 7 Unlike the
Western system of justice, in which individual rights are
paramount, peacemaking primarily aims to repair relationships
among individuals and to restore community harmony. Unlike the
Anglo-American paradigm, traditional tribal dispute resolution
procedures are fairly informal and typically proceed outside of
tribal court. 8
While from the outside, this dual system seems to do no more
than provide tribal members with options regarding where they
want to settle their civil disputes, a number of scholars find the
dual system more problematic. Some scholars argue that because
the adversary system promotes values—such as individualism—
that are antithetical to tribal values, employment of Western justice
systems tears at the fabric of tribal communities and undermines
tribal sovereignty. 9 These scholars argue that tribes should rely less
on the Western-influenced tribal court system, and instead rely
more on traditional, informal dispute resolution techniques, such as
peacemaking, which reflect and promote tribal values. 10 However,
other scholars believe just the opposite. This latter group of
scholars strongly believes that strengthening the current model of
tribal courts, and tribal courts’ use of Western legal traditions, will
help guarantee tribal sovereignty. 11 These scholars argue that tribal
independence and self-government necessitate state and federal
recognition of tribal court judgments. 12 This recognition requires
that tribal courts have legitimacy, which can only come from
adhering to certain Western legal traditions. 13
These scholars’ opposing positions frame a policy debate, at
the root of which is a question regarding how tribes can resolve
disputes among members in a manner that best benefits tribal
7

Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience: The Dynamic Challenge of
Lawyers’ Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 821, 835 (1996).
8
Porter, supra note 3, at 257.
9
Id. at 237-38.
10
See Justice Raymond D. Austin, American Indian Customary Law in the
Modern Courts of American Indian Nations, 11 WYO. L. REV. 351 (2011).
11
Clarkson, supra note 1, at 509.
12
Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law 24 N.M.
L. REV. 225225, 242 (1994).
13
Id. at 262-63.
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communities and members. This article considers this question and
takes the position that tribal communities can best be served by
relying primarily on peacemaking techniques, rather than the
Western-style adversarial litigation, for resolving interpersonal
civil disputes. Unlike the perspectives considered above, however,
this article does not use policy to support its conclusion that tribes
should actively seek to emphasize peacemaking as the preferred
dispute resolution technique. Instead, this conclusion is based on
mainly functional grounds, that is, how the Western adversarial
tradition compares in efficacy to the peacemaking system for
resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Because the peacemaking
system is far more adapted to the dynamics of human social
systems, such as tribes, this article concludes that peacemaking is a
more effective civil dispute resolution tool for tribes.
This article is premised on two assumptions. First, it is
assumed that, while the policy behind choosing a dispute
resolution system is important, what is equally important is that the
dispute resolution procedure employed by tribes be effective at
resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Dispute resolution
procedures that are effective at resolving interpersonal civil
disputes are particularly crucial for tribes, whose long-term
endurance depends on the maintenance of community cohesion. 14
Second, it is assumed that the most effective dispute resolution
system will be the system that is best adapted to the dynamics
governing human social systems. Based upon these two premises,
this article uses complex adaptive systems theory to assess the
relative effectiveness of the two dispute resolution procedures in
terms of their adaptability to the dynamics governing the behaviors
of complex human social systems. Ultimately, this article
concludes that because traditional, tribal dispute resolution
procedures are better adapted to human social systems, they are
more effective at actually resolving interpersonal civil disputes.
Therefore, traditional, tribal dispute resolution procedures

14

Gretchen Ulrich, Widening the Circle: Adapting Traditional Indian Dispute
Resolution Methods to Implement Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Restorative Justice in Modern Communities, 20 Hamline J. PUB. L. & POL’Y
419, 441 (1999).
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strengthen tribal communities in ways that Western adversarial
dispute resolution procedures cannot.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines how tribes
came to employ dual justice systems with such widely diverging
concepts of justice. Part II analyzes various aspects of the Western
adversarial system that are employed in many tribal courts. Part II
also examines the unique procedures used in adversarial litigation
and the values and assumptions underlying this Anglo-American
approach to resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Part III engages
in a similar examination of the Peacemaking system. While
peacemaking techniques vary significantly from tribe to tribe, Part
III specifically focuses on the peacemaking procedures employed
by the Navajo Nation as a model example of how peacemaking
proceeds. Part IV outlines and explains systems theory principles
that are relevant to human social system dynamics and explains
how human social systems, such as Indian tribes, operate as
complex adaptive systems. Part IV then analyzes both the Western
adversarial and peacemaking systems, in light of the insights
provided from complex adaptive systems theory, to determine
which system best comports with the dynamics governing human
social systems. Ultimately, the article concludes that because
peacemaking employs methods that are far more adapted to the
principle dynamics governing human social systems, peacemaking
is a more effective dispute resolution system. From a systems
theory perspective, this article concludes that because it is likely
more effective at resolving disputes, a greater use of peacemaking
could better strengthen tribal communities than primarily relying
on the adversarial system to resolve interpersonal civil disputes.
DISCUSSION
I. DUAL SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
The dual justice system present in many tribes today is a PostColumbian phenomena directly resulting from American
colonization. 15 Prior to colonization, most Indian tribes relied on a
15

See Porter, supra note 3, at 237.
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single traditional or customary system of law that was “derived
from rules of conduct and attitudes of the mind concerning their
kinship system.” 16 Because Indian law was a function of oral
tradition, colonists encountering the Indians erroneously concluded
that tribes had no law or justice. Consequently, a significant part of
the American assimilation program was to impose Western justice
traditions, such as the adversarial system, on Indian tribes. 17 The
following part provides a chronology of the major federal actions
that led to the utilization of Western justice practices by Indian
tribes.
A. Origins of the Western Legal Tradition in Tribal Justice Systems
The incorporation of the Anglo-American adversarial justice
paradigm into tribal justice systems can be traced to the political
backlash that followed the 1881 Supreme Court case Ex parte Kangi-shun-ca (otherwise known as Crow Dog). 18 Prior to Crow Dog,
tribes’ justice systems remained fairly intact, except that that tribes
had virtually no jurisdiction over non-Indians. 19 In particular,
tribes retained exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by one
Indian against another Indian. 20 However, in Crow Dog, the
federal government decided to test these jurisdictional limits by
asserting jurisdiction over an Indian who was accused of
murdering another Indian. 21
Crow Dog was a member of the Brule tribe who was accused
of shooting and killing a political rival and fellow Brule tribal
member named Spotted Tail. 22 A day after the shooting, the tribal
council ordered an end to the fighting that had followed the killing,
and initiated dispute resolution procedures designed to reconcile
the families involved. 23 After a traditional peacemaking ceremony,
16

Bradford, supra note 4, at 565.
See Jessica Metoui, Returning to the Circle: The Reemergence of Traditional
Dispute Resolution in Native American Communities, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 517,
518 (2007).
18
Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S. Ct. 396, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
19
Bradford, supra note 4, at 568.
20
Id.
21
See Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556.
22
Bradford, supra note 4, at 568.
23
Id.
17
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the family of Spotted Tail agreed to accept payment from Crow
Dog of $600, eight horses, and one blanket to resolve the dispute. 24
Despite the resolution reached by the tribal council, unsatisfied
federal officials arrested Crow Dog and tried him under federal law
for murder in the federal Territorial Court of South Dakota. 25 The
federal court subsequently found Crow Dog guilty of murder and
sentenced him to death. 26 However, Crow Dog appealed his
conviction on the grounds that the federal court ruling was invalid
for lack of jurisdiction. 27 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed
the conviction. 28 The court supported its decision by noting that
the treaties between the tribe and the federal government in effect
at that time gave the tribe a preeminent right to exercise their own
methods, and resolve disputes internally within the tribe, without
United States interference. 29
Reeling from the result in Crow Dog, Congress undertook the
goal of eliminating the “savage quality” of tribal law in order to
impose “white man’s morality.” 30 To achieve these ends, Congress
passed the Major Crimes Act, 31 which extended federal criminal
jurisdiction over major felonies committed by Indians on
reservations regardless of the status of their victims. 32 In addition,
the United States Department of the Interior, the federal agency
responsible for Indian affairs, began to develop court systems on
Indian reservations, referred to as the Courts of Indian Offenses or
“C.F.R. Courts.” 33 Ultimately, these courts enforced federal
regulations designed to extinguish tribal culture and tribal legal
systems, and were part of Congress’s overarching Indian policy of
assimilation. 34

24

Id.
Id.
26
Id.
27
See Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Bradford, supra note 4, at 570.
31
Major Crimes Act, Act of March 3, 1885, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385.
32
Bradford, supra note 4, at 570-71.
33
Justice Raymond D. Austin, American Indian Customary Law in the Modern
Courts of American Indian Nations, 11 WYO. L. REV. 351, 356-57 (2011).
34
Id.
25
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C.F.R. Courts operated under the Anglo-American justice
paradigm and handled less serious criminal actions as well as
disputes among tribal members. 35 Many of the judges of C.F.R.
Courts were the local Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs
superintendents whose primary objective was to further
assimilationist ideals and to suppress any activities that interfered
with the integration goal. 36 The courts largely failed to reflect
Indian values and customs. Instead, the courts utilized the
adversarial model, and were designed to change tribal values into
those of American civilized society. 37
Traditional tribal justice systems were again subjected to
Western influence in 1934 with the passage of the Federal Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA). 38 The IRA, or “Indian New Deal,” was
a reflection of a remarkable sea change by Congress in regards to
its Indian policy. Rather than attempting to assimilate and integrate
Indians into American society, the IRA aimed to strengthen and
encourage tribal sovereignty and self-government. 39 While the act
aimed to revitalize tribes, such that they would reassume
responsibility for their own affairs, ultimately the act’s passage
resulted in the tribes further incorporating Western ideas of justice
into their legal systems. 40
The IRA provided that any tribe that adopted its provisions
could establish a constitutional form of government that would be
recognized by the United States. 41 The IRA gave tribes the option
of adopting constitutions based on boilerplate provisions included
in the IRA. 42 In response, nearly 200 tribes adopted IRA
constitutions. 43 The IRA “form” constitutions deviated from the
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461-70; Bradford, supra note 4, at
572-73.
39
Mathew L. M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85
NEB. L. REV. 121, 141 (2006).
40
Bradford, supra note 4, at 573.
41
L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium,
96, COLUM. L. REV. 809, 832 (1996).
42
Id.
43
Jason P. Hipp, Rethinking Rewriting: Tribal Constitutional Amendment and
Reform, 4 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 73, 74 (2013).
36
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federal constitution in a number of respects. Notably, they did not
provide for an independent judiciary or for separation of powers. 44
In response to this omission, tribes took legislative action and
established their own tribal judiciaries. These tribal judiciaries
were modeled after the form and structure of the Anglo-American
court system, and instituted the adversarial system for resolving
disputes. 45 Because of their foreign model and structure, tribal
judges were forced to borrow extensively from both American
substantive and procedural law. 46
Tribal justice systems were further subjected to Western
influence when, in 1954, Congress passed another law that resulted
in the Westernization of tribal justice systems. Public Law 280 was
an outgrowth of yet another development in congressional Indian
policy, aptly referred to as the “termination era.” 47 During the
termination era, Congress was primarily concerned with
terminating federal responsibility for Indian tribes’ welfare. 48
Public Law 280 sought to further this goal by establishing a system
of concurrent jurisdiction between the state and tribal court
systems. 49 The law vested state courts with civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction over causes of action involving Indians, arising on
Indian lands, and extending to state criminal jurisdiction over
Indian lands located within state lines. 50 While the law was
mandatory in only a handful of states, it provided that any other
state could unilaterally accept jurisdiction over Indian lands
located within its borders. 51
One effect of the concurrent jurisdiction established by Public
Law 280 was that jurisdiction over a case was determined by
44

Id. at 80-82; Valencia Weber, supra note 8, at 236.
See Margery H. Brown, Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the Development
of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 219-20 (1991).
46
Fletcher, supra note 37, at 739.
47
Robert T. Anderson, Criminal Jurisdiction, Tribal Courts and Public
Defenders, 13 FALL- KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y, 141 (2003).
48
Vanessa J. Jiménez, Concurrent Tribal and State Jurisdiction Under Public
Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1627, 1661 (1998).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Julie A. Pace, Enforcement of Tribal Law in Federal Court: Affirmation of
Indian Sovereignty or a Step Back Towards Assimilation, 24 ARIZ. ST. L. J.435,
450 (1992).
45
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where the action was first filed – tribal or state court. Access to the
state courts had the effect of putting competitive pressure on tribal
courts to keep up with state laws and procedures. 52 Consequently,
in order to not be rendered obsolete by the state courts, tribal
courts abandoned a number of their traditional procedures and
processes in favor of adopting those analogous to state systems. 53
In their attempts to keep up, tribes further adopted adversarial
methods of dispute resolution. 54
By the 1960’s Congress had changed directions again
regarding its Indian policy. Fueled by the civil rights movement,
Congress began to focus on the civil rights of Indians. 55
Addressing the reality that the Indian nations were not subject to
the federal constitution or the Bill of Rights, Congress passed the
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 56 The ICRA introduced a
jurisprudence of individual rights within tribal courts, which
caused tribes to abandon traditional value systems, based on
collective wellbeing and community harmony, in exchange for
value systems reflective of individualism. 57 From the Indian
perspective, a number of the fundamental rights guarantees were
foreign to traditional methods of Indian dispute resolution. Tribal
traditions of fairness and community justice were soon replaced by
concerns with the values embraced by the adversary system, such
as due process, equal protection, the right to a speedy trial, etc. 58
Ultimately, the ICRA, like the Major Crimes Act, the IRA, and
Public Law 280, required tribes to adopt a number of AngloAmerican justice procedures and resulted in instilling adversarial
litigation methods into tribal justice systems.

52

Porter, supra note 3, at 270.
Id.
54
Bradford, supra note 4, at 573.
55
Id. at 573-74.
56
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), Pub. L. No. 90-284, Stat. 77
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994); Bradford, supra note 3,
at 574.
57
Bradford, supra note 4, at 574-75.
58
Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 123-24 (1993).
53
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II. THE WESTERN ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Today, the majority of disputes in Indian country are still
resolved in tribal courts employing some degree of the Western
adversarial principles of adjudication. 59 Even though tribal courts
have begun reincorporating customary substantive law and made
various procedural adjustments in adjudicatory dispute
resolution, 60 the majority of tribal courts employing the adversary
system remain faithful to the general rules governing the process. 61
Adversarial justice systems inside and outside tribal courts have a
common method of operations that reflects a specific narrative
about how justice is achieved. Additionally, Western adversarial
tradition reflects specific values as a result of certain fundamental
assumptions regarding the nature of humans and human societies.
The following section provides an overview of the major features
of adversarial justice that trial courts still utilize today.
A. Distinct Methods of Operation
The adversary system operates differently than other civil
dispute resolution processes in three main respects. 62 First, the
adversary system requires party presentation of the evidence in a
competitive rather than cooperative setting. 63 Competition is key to
the effectiveness of the adversary system, and numerous
procedural rules are designed to ensure both that the requisite
threshold level of competition has been met and that the process is
as competitive as possible. 64 For example, constitutional and
prudential standing rules are designed to serve these ends. The
assumption that only the person directly affected by the dispute
59

Metoui, supra note 15, 518.
Austin, supra note 8, at 362.
61
Metoui, supra note 15, at 519-20.
62
Paul T. Wangerin, The Political and Economic Roots of the “Adversary
System” of Justice and “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 203, 203-05 (1994).
63
Id. at 205.
64
Michael Dominic Meuti, Legalistic Individualism: An Alternative Analysis of
Kagan’s Adversarial Legalism, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 336337 (2004).
60
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will be sufficiently interested in the dispute to provide the
sharpness of conflict required for a judicial decision, excludes
family members or friends of a litigant from participating in the
dispute resolution process, even if they experience substantial
secondary effects as a result of the dispute.
Second, in an adversarial system, the responsibility for
investigating, authenticating, and presenting evidence falls solely
on the individual disputants, while a neutral fact finder is tasked
with issuing a final decision regarding the dispute. 65 In many
respects, the adversary system affords disputing parties enormous
amounts of power. Litigants alone, decide the evidence and
arguments the court will hear. Judges or fact-finders do not
participate in investigation of the evidence or the formulation of
accurate legal arguments. Consequently, judges do not probe
beyond a witness’s veneer in order to assess credibility beyond
spoken assertions, nor will a judge offer up a different perspective
on the governing law not raised by the parties. Instead, the judge or
fact-finder’s role is limited to objectively evaluating the evidence
presented, and applying established legal principles to the facts in
order to reach a decision that will govern the outcome of the
dispute. 66
While the judge or fact-finder’s role may be limited, it is
nevertheless exclusive. Individual disputants play no role in
determining the outcome of the dispute, beyond presenting their
version of events during the trial. 67 Once all the evidence has been
presented, the neutral decision-maker determines how the dispute
will be resolved without input from the parties. 68 Because the
parties cannot participate in crafting a solution, the adversary
system in some respects circumscribes disputants’ control over the
conflict. The requirement that a judge or jury be impartial is
critical given the disputants’ exclusion from the decision-making
process. Neutrality of the judge or jury is essential to ensure both

65

Wangerin, supra note 60, at 204.
Id.
67
Id. at 204-05.
68
Id.
66
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the evenhanded consideration of each case and the appearance of
fairness. 69
The third distinguishing feature of the adversary system is that
it employs a highly structured forensic procedure. 70 Elaborate sets
of rules govern the pretrial and post-trial periods, the trial itself,
and the behavior of both those representing the disputants and the
judges. 71 The rules of procedure produce a climactic confrontation
between the parties in a trial that the neutral decision-maker
observes and from which it makes its decision resolving the
dispute. 72 The procedural rules also function to distill the
amorphous cloud of conflict into discrete, workable legal
components, or issues. The evidence rules are designed to keep the
trial fair and to narrowly focus the legal issues in dispute. 73 These
rules prohibit unfairly prejudicial evidence and exclude evidence
that is irrelevant to the legal aspects of the conflict. 74 Because the
highly competitive nature of a trial promotes a win-at-all-cost
attitude, the adversary system employs a set of ethical rules to
control the behavior of the disputants and their representatives. 75
Operating together, these rules create a framework providing for a
narrow focus and rigid order in the dispute resolution process. 76
B. Underlying Narrative
The system’s design reflects a narrative about how justice is
best achieved. The narrative behind the adversary system is
summarized as follows: Justice is achieved when an impartial
decision-maker decides the outcome of a dispute based upon the
application of discrete and established legal principles to the

69
Stephen A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary
System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 737-738 (1983).
70
Wangerin, supra note 60, at 204-05.
71
Landsman, supra note 67, 716-17.
72
Id. at 716.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 717.
76
Gerold W. Hardcastle, Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court
Judge’s Perspective, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 57, 68 (2005).
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factual truths of a disputed situation. 77 The truth of a disputed
situation is reached not through cooperation between the parties,
but by orchestrating a clash between the parties’ respective
interests and arguments. 78 Because only individuals who are
personally involved in a particular dispute will have the incentive
to proffer the best arguments in resolving the dispute, the
disputants themselves must be responsible for gathering all of the
available evidence and formulating the arguments thereon. 79
Consequently, the judge, other agents of government, or those not
directly involved in the dispute must stay out of the process of
investigation and argument formulation. 80 The judge or fact-finder
is concerned only with making an objective and enforceable
decision based upon applying established legal principles to the
truth of the case. 81 In order to keep the game fair at all times and to
protect the truth from being distorted by overzealous selfadvocacy, extensive procedural and evidentiary rules must govern
all stages of the process. 82
C. Principal Values
The adversary system reflects and seeks to further a distinct set
of values. Because the system is designed to maintain a free
society in which individual rights are central, 83 the system places a
high, if not the highest, value on protecting individual rights. 84
Within the system, individual rights are given priority over both
governmental interests and community rights. 85 Various aspects of
the system reflect a preference for individual over governmental
interests. The process confers broad authority on the disputing
parties while strictly limiting the role of the judge or the fact-

77

Meuti, supra note 62, at 337.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Wangerin, supra note 60, at 203-04.
81
Id.
82
Meuti, supra note 62 at 337-38.
83
Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L.
REV. 57, 57 (1998).
84
Meuti, supra note 62, at 339.
85
Id.
78
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finder. 86 The breadth of party control over the process and the
limited authority and role of judges reflects a general mistrust of
government, and a need to safeguard the rights and freedom of
individuals against the perceived risks of abuse of governmental
power. Additionally, the system prioritizes individual rights over
communal rights. 87 The heart of adversary adjudication is the
vindication of the individual rights of the litigants via a court
battle. 88 In this battle, the focus is on individual conflict rather than
fostering community harmony. 89 Consequently, while it may be in
the best interest of the community to resolve a dispute peacefully
and quickly, the adversary system prioritizes individual interests
by ensuring that disputes are resolved based on the most reliable
evidence, even if this comes with an apparent cost of protracted,
and at times, irreparable conflict.
The second set of principal values of the adversary system
includes those of truth and fairness. 90 The system’s defining
features, in fact, are designed to promote the discovery of the truth
regarding a dispute and to enable the impartial decision-maker to
fairly determine the outcome of the dispute based solely on
applying established legal principles to the truth surrounding the
conflict. 91 Proponents of the system eschew cooperative dispute
resolution processes on the grounds that only adverse selfinterested parties will expose and bring to light the truth of a
dispute. 92 Concern for the truth and fairness also mandates that the
ultimate decision-maker be an impartial party who has no
relationship with the parties or familiarity with the dispute. 93 Only
disinterested decision-makers are able to come to an honest
decision by employing a fair and accurate assessment of the
evidence presented and the law to be applied. 94
86

Id.
Id.
88
Metoui, supra note 15, at 338.
89
Hardcastle, supra note 74, at 60.
90
Id. at 60-61.
91
Id. at 60-61, 66.
92
Id. at 60-61.
93
Id.
94
Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstones of the Judicial Process, 2-SPG KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 5, 12-13 (1993).
87
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D. Assumptions Underlying Adversary System
The adversary legal system is also premised on a number of
assumptions regarding the nature of human societies and the nature
of human beings. An easily overlooked assumption is that humans
and societies benefit from a system that prioritizes individual rights
at the expense of individual cooperation. The assumption that the
adversary system benefits society rests upon two fundamental
ideas. First, freedom is paramount in society. Second, the best way
to ensure a free society is to safeguard each human’s freedom,
individually.
While more obscured, another assumption underlying the
adversary system is that humans are autonomous. 95 The belief in
individual autonomy is readily apparent when one considers that a
primary aim of the adversarial system is to protect individual rights
from intrusions by governments and other individuals. 96 A
precursor to protecting individual autonomy is, of course, the
belief that individual autonomy exists.
The adversary system also assumes that humans behave as
rational agents who are driven by self-interest. 97 Adversary
litigation assumes that humans formulate and act in accordance
with forward-looking strategies designed to optimize solely the
individual’s own selfish interests. 98 This assumption manifests in
the amount of responsibility the system places on the individual
disputing parties throughout the adversary process. The momentum
of the process relies entirely on and requires individuals to pursue
their own interests. 99 Furthermore, a number of the procedural
rules governing the adversary dispute process were created on the
assumption that individuals directly involved in a dispute would
fight so fiercely for their own self-interest alone that rules must be
created to keep the process fair. 100
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Dovetailing from the assumption that humans behave rationally
based on their own selfish interests, is the assumption that human
behavior can be predicted. Every aspect of the adversary system
depends for its effectiveness on the proposition that humans
behave in predictable ways. The assumption of predictability
works in concert with the assumptions of rationality and selfinterest. Adversary proponents argue that, because humans are
rational beings who are driven to maximize their selfish interests,
humans will respond predictably to external variables that either
enhance or diminish their self-interest. 101 For instance, the system
expects that individuals will be incentivized to pursue adversary
adjudication when their self-interests have been infringed. 102 The
system predicts that humans will vigorously pursue their cases in
order to vindicate or maximize their self-interests or in an effort to
avoid the curtailment of their self-interests. 103 Additionally, the
system relies on predictable human responses to court decisions.
Individuals will avoid violating the final decision because of the
threat to the individual’s self-interest that results from legal
sanctions accompanying the violation.
E. Collateral Effects
The distinct structure, underlying narrative, values, and
assumptions of the adversary system have created a number of
collateral characteristics that also readily distinguish the
adversarial system from other legal systems. These include the
system’s general inaccessibility and its reliance on lawyers, the
limited remedial power of the adversarial system, the interpersonal
discord produced by the system, and the need for hierarchical
control.
First, for a number of reasons, the adversary system has
evolved to a point where it is not readily accessible to the average
citizen. 104 The adversary system employs extensive procedural
101
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and evidentiary rules designed to control the dispute process in
order to infuse the structure and safeguards into the adversary
process necessary to enable accurate fact-finding. 105 These rules
are both extensive and largely unintelligible to the average citizen.
Because most individuals alone cannot successfully navigate the
rules and the procedures involved with the adversary system,
attorneys must play a substantial role in the process. 106 The
prevalence of attorneys in the legal system is another
distinguishing feature of the adversary system. 107 Unfortunately,
and frequently, individuals are unable to afford the attorneys’ fees
incurred by litigation. 108 Thus, these individuals are unable to use
the system to resolve their disputes. 109 Consequently, the courts,
while technically open to everyone’s claims, are functionally
inaccessible to a great portion of the population simply because
they do not have the means to engage in the adversary process.
Second, the adversary system is structured to provide litigants
with limited remedial measures. 110 The adversary system pits two
sides of a dispute against one another in a search for truth to which
it can apply neutral legal principles in order to obtain a just result.
However, by forcing disputants to engage in a battle of interests,
the system creates a zero-sum game in which the only result is that
one party is the winner while the other party is the loser. 111 In this
system, the neutral decision-maker is limited to issuing an all-ornothing decision which, inevitably leaves one of the two parties
entirely unsatisfied. In addition to being constrained by the winlose dynamic created by the binary system, courts are usually
constrained by the limited remedies they can grant. 112 Remedies
for disputes often come in only a few varieties, such as monetary
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damages, injunctions, or declaratory judgments. 113 Thus, resolution
of a dispute usually will involve winner-takes-all determination
accompanied by a remedy that is essentially a one-size-fits-all
outcome for the winning disputant. 114
Third, individuals who have resolved disputes through the
adversary system, especially litigation involving an ongoing
interpersonal conflict, often report that the process of engaging in
litigation resulted in worsening the interpersonal conflict that gave
rise to the dispute in the first place. 115 The disintegration of the
relationship between disputants is not entirely unexpected. The
adversary system emphasizes competition rather than cooperation,
and the goal of winning the dispute trumps the goal of repairing the
damage to the underlying relationship. 116 Resolution of the
interpersonal discord also goes ignored within the adversary
system when parties to the dispute rarely interact with each other,
but act instead only through their attorneys. 117 Consequently, in
some respects the procedures and processes of the adversarial
system further divide the disputants and never really solve their
underlying conflict.
Finally, the adversary system operates as a vertical justice
system, meaning that it relies on hierarchies of power to control the
administration, enactment, and enforcement of justice. 118
Adversarial disputes are determined by a third-party, neutral
decision-maker, such as a judge or jury. 119 As such, the disputing
parties themselves do not participate in the formation of a decision
regarding the outcome of their dispute. 120 Because this often
results in at least one party, usually the losing party, being
unsatisfied, there must be a mechanism in place to ensure that the
parties do not deviate from the decision based on their own self113
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interest. 121 Imposing legal or punitive consequences on individuals
who fail to conform to the court’s final decision serves as this
mechanism by giving the court’s judgment the force of law. 122
III. PEACEMAKING: NAVAJO PEACEMAKINg IN THE 21st CENTURY
By the mid-1970’s, the acrimonious results of congressional
actions imposing Western adversarial principles onto Indian justice
systems were becoming apparent. 123 Over generations of federal
Indian policy, tribal court procedures conformed more and more to
the United States legal system, while becoming more divorced
from tribal values. 124 The result was internal conflict and
dissatisfaction among tribes whose more flexible justice systems
had been wrestled away from decades of unfavorable federal
policies. 125
At this time, however, a number of tribes were defying federal
policies and secretly applying rediscovered tribal customary
law. 126 Also, a number of tribes were making explicit provisions
for informal dispute resolution processes that employed traditional
tribal dispute resolution procedures based on tribal conceptions of
justice. 127 Tribal support for the employment of traditional dispute
resolution mechanisms was further bolstered by the advent of
alternative dispute resolution within mainstream Western legal
culture. 128 These non-adversarial dispute resolution procedures
came to be known as “peacemaking.” 129 The “tribal peacemaking”
concept was defined as “any system of dispute resolution used
within a Native American community which utilizes nonadversarial strategies . . . [and] incorporates some traditional or
customary approaches . . . the aim of which is conciliation and
121
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restoration of peace and harmony.” 130 Presently, more than one
hundred tribal court systems employ some form of tribal
peacemaking for resolving civil disputes. 131
Like the adversary system, the peacemaking process has an
ascertainable method of operations and an underlying narrative
regarding how justice is best achieved. Additionally, peacemaking
reflects certain values and assumptions regarding humans and
society. The following part examines specific aspects of
peacemaking and contrasts peacemaking with the adversary system
for resolving interpersonal civil disputes. Because the Navajo
Peacemaking Program is “[p]erhaps the foremost example of
native people resetting the peacemaking foundation,” 132 this part
specifically focuses on the Navajo system as a model for
peacemaking systems, generally.
The Navajo Nation has a long history of utilizing peacemaking
techniques for resolving disputes. Even when Congress was
attempting to eradicate traditional tribal justice systems by
imposing C.F.R. courts upon tribes, the Navajos continued to
secretly utilize peacemaking techniques to resolve interpersonal
disputes between tribal members. Then, in the early 1980’s, the
Navajos reformed their judicial systems by formally establishing a
Peacemakers Court. Currently, every judicial district within the
Navajo Nation includes a Peacemakers Court that provides
members with an alternative forum for the resolution of certain
disputes. This formal recognition of peacemaking through the
establishment of Peacemaker Courts, in addition to the rich history
of Navajo peacemaking techniques that endured the federal
government’s assimilationist efforts, has made the Navajo
Peacemaking Program one of the most well-developed
peacemaking systems in the United States. 133 As such, the Navajo

130

Phyllis E. Bernard, Community and Conscience: The Dynamic Challenge of
Lawyers’ Ethics in Tribal Peacemaking, 27 U. TOL. L. REV.821, 835 (1996).
131
Bradford, supra note 4, at 579.
132
Porter, supra note 3, at 301.
133
Michael D. Lieder, Navajo Dispute Resolution and Promissory Obligations:
Continuity and Change in the Largest Native American Nation, 18 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1993).

2016]

Complex Adaptive Peacemaking

284

Peacemaking Program provides an excellent and informative case
study of the peacemaking process.
A. Method of Operation of Navajo Peacemaking
Navajo peacemaking has a number of defining features that
make it a unique dispute resolution system. Peacemaking most
closely resembles the Anglo-American dispute process of
mediation. 134 While the process can be distinguished from
adversarial dispute resolution in many ways, there are three major
operational distinctions between the two dispute resolution
systems. First, peacemaking encourages cooperative, rather than
competitive, conflict resolution. 135 Second, in peacemaking,
conflict is resolved through an agreement that is consensual and
formulated by the disputants, rather than by a court imposed
decision. 136 Third, peacemaking occurs in the absence of detailed
governing rules, rather than according to extensive procedural and
evidentiary designs. 137 The following section addresses these
distinctions in addition to a number of more nuanced differences
between the systems that result from these larger divergences.
1. Cooperation Not Competition
One of the most striking differences between the operations of
the peacemaking and adversarial system employed in tribal courts
lies in the nature of party dynamics encouraged by the systems.
The adversary system polarizes disputants by requiring they take
sharply conflicting positions, and by providing a competitive
forum for them to engage in a legal battle to advance their
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positions. 138 Conversely, the peacemaking process employs
numerous techniques designed to do the exact opposite—bring the
parties into alignment by fostering an environment of
cooperation. 139
For example, Navajo peacemaking promotes party cooperation
through creating a more inclusive process. While the adversary
process ensures conflict by excluding everyone except the
individuals directly involved in the dispute, peacemaking allows
anyone who identifies as an interested person to participate in the
peacemaking process. 140 By expanding the scope of individuals
who can participate in the process, Navajo peacemaking increases
cooperation among disputing parties. 141 Frequently, individuals
related to a disputant will offer the disputant different perspectives
on the disputant’s problematic or questionable behavior. 142 By
allowing more individuals to participate, disputants hear a range of
perspectives beyond solely those of the individual with whom they
are disputing. These alternative perspectives encourage the
disputant to loosen his grip on his version of events and keep an
open mind regarding how best to proceed in resolving the
dispute. 143
The scope of topics discussed during peacemaking also fosters
cooperation between parties. In the adversary system, trial is the
major dispute resolution event, and is comprised solely of the
disputants’ differing versions of the factual events surrounding the
dispute. 144 The meat of trial is conflict; each party tries to convince
the decision-maker to adopt his version of events while also
attempting to undermine the adverse party’s case. 145 While
peacemaking certainly affords the disputing parties the
opportunities to recount their version of the conflict, peacemaking
is not solely a formal contest regarding which party has the more
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convincing story. 146 Instead, during the process, Navajo
peacemakers often steer the conversation toward the guiding
principles of Navajo teachings or traditions and thereby evoke a
belief system the parties share. 147 By discussing Navajo customs
and practices with the parties, the peacemaker shifts the discussion
to topics of common ground. This shift in dialogue–from what the
parties do not have in common to what they do have in common–
encourages the parties to view one another with a greater sense of
camaraderie rather than suspicion and anger. 148
2. Consensual Agreement Between Parties
A second operational distinction between Navajo peacemaking
system and Westernized adversarial adjudication utilized by tribal
courts is the nature of the resolution achieved. The peacemaking
process works to develop consensus between the disputing
parties. 149 The process concludes when the parties have formulated
and agreed to abide by an agreement that resolves the dispute and
repairs the parties’ relationship. 150 The peacemaker, who works
much like a mediator, is a vital resource to the parties throughout
this process, and provides them with a respected third-person
perspective on the dispute and with ideas for reconciliation. 151
Because there is no phase of the process in which any party,
including the peacemaker, is either granted exclusive authority or
entirely divested of authority, all participants in Navajo
peacemaking exist in egalitarian relationships that enable each
individual to actively participate throughout every process of
peacemaking. 152 The peacemaking process lies in sharp contrast to
the adversary system, which establishes an unambiguous division
of power between the parties, who are given exclusive control over
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the proceedings and trial, and the decision-maker, who exclusively
controls the outcome of the dispute. 153
Because parties to a peacemaking draft the agreement resolving
their dispute, there is no danger that the peacemaker will impose
upon the parties an unfair outcome based on favoritism or unfair
dealings. Consequently, although the peacemaker cannot have
prejudice toward a party or an interest in the outcome of the
peacemaking, 154 there is no hard and fast requirement that the
peacemaker remain absolutely objective and neutral at all times
during the process, unlike there is in the adversary system. 155 In
fact, the peacemaker is expected to offer the disputants a point of
view grounded in Navajo values, such as harmony, community,
and solidarity. 156 Peacemakers also often lecture or instruct the
participants on traditional Navajo teachings relevant to the
participants’ specific problem. 157 Thus, while the peacemaker
cannot be partial to a particular disputant, the peacemaker is
expected to be partial toward the Navajo point of view and to
continually offer this perspective to the parties throughout the
peacemaking. 158
3. Flexible Framework for Dispute Resolution
While a loose framework of rules governs numerous aspects of
the peacemaking process, the process is largely designed to afford
the peacemaker and parties a great deal of flexibility when
resolving a dispute. 159 The rules, devised by the Navajo Nation
Judicial Council, provide an outline for the process of
peacemaking and generally pertain to what kind of disputes can be
resolved by peacemaking, who can serve as a peacemaker and
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how, and the extent of the peacemaker’s role and
responsibilities. 160
Peacemaking can be initiated by disputing parties, or the
Navajo District Court may refer a party to the Peacemaker
division. 161 Any member of the Navajo Nation who is injured,
hurt, or aggrieved by the actions of another may initiate
peacemaking. 162 Peacemaking typically is used where the parties
to the dispute are members of the Navajo Tribe and where the
dispute involves certain personal and community relationships. 163
Once an individual has requested a peacemaking, or the
District Court has transferred a dispute to the peacemaker division,
the District Court judge appoints a named Peacemaker to conduct
peacemaking proceedings. 164 Typically, each Navajo chapter
selects and certifies to the District Court the individuals who may
serve as a peacemaker. 165 The rules governing peacemaking
provide guidelines for who can serve as a peacemaker and what is
necessary for eligibility. In order to be eligible to serve as a
peacemaker, a person must have the respect of the community, an
ability to work with tribal members, a reputation for integrity,
honesty, humanity, and an ability to resolve local problems. 166 The
rules specify that one does not need to be a government or
religious leader to serve as a peacemaker, rather, the main thing
that is desired is that the person chosen will have such respect that
the people who are asked to solve their problems by agreement
will listen. 167 The clerk of the District Court maintains a roll of
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peacemakers from which peacemakers are appointed. 168 The
parties, however, may select their own peacemaker as long as
everyone agrees to the appointment.
Although they are not identical, the peacemaking process
resembles mediation. 169 Parties typically sit in a circle and “talk
things out,” explaining their various interests. 170 Members of the
parties’ community and family provide input during the process.
Notably, unlike the adversary system, there are no rigid rules about
what must be discussed and what topics remain off-limits. 171 It is
common for the disputants to discuss how they feel about the
dispute and what they need in order to come to an agreement.172
Peacemaking also operates in the absence of rules governing how
the peacemaker and parties must come to a resolution. 173 Instead,
drafters of the peacemaking rules intentionally omitted procedural
requirements in order to give peacemakers and parties the
flexibility to employ whatever resolution procedures best fit the
situation. 174 While the rules prohibit peacemakers from using
force, violence, or violating the parties’ rights secured by the
Navajo Bill of Rights, the peacemakers remain free to “[u]se any
reasonable means to obtain peaceful, cooperative, and voluntary
resolution of a dispute subject to peacemaking.” 175
A final noteworthy difference between the rules and
frameworks for the peacemaking and adversary process is how the
rules of each system approach conflict generally. One of the
functions of the procedural and evidentiary rules governing the
adversarial system is to distill interpersonal conflict into discrete
legal issues. 176 After the conflict has been simplified and broken
168
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into its component legal parts, the trial court judge, after discerning
the factual truths relevant to the legal issues in a case, simply
applies established legal precedent to reach a decision. 177
Peacemaking has no analogous procedure. Instead, peacemaking
takes a flexible approach to conflict and considers more than solely
the legal aspects of a dispute. 178 Peacemaking recognizes both the
myriad reasons for conflict and the myriad ways conflict affects
disputants, and the disputants’ families. Individual participants are
able to express anything they need to express in order to reach
resolution–little evidence or discussion is excluded. 179 Disputants’
families are allowed to do the same in order to effectuate
reconciliation. 180 Because peacemaking does not limit participation
in the dispute resolution process to only those directly involved
with the dispute, peacemaking approaches the dispute in a holistic
manner that accounts for the complexity and multi-faceted
dimension of conflict.
a. Underlying Narrative
The Navajo peacemaking process reflects a narrative about
how justice is achieved in dispute resolution situations. In contrast
to the adversary system, peacemaking does not seek to achieve
justice with mathematical precision by applying neutral legal
principles to the facts of the dispute. Instead, in peacemaking,
justice is a function of the goals the process seeks to achieve and
the means the process employs to achieve them. Peacemaking
utilizes Navajo justice concepts, such as “equality, consent, talking
things out, and restoring people to good relations with each other
in a community,” 181 in order to restore unity and harmony among
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the feuding parties. 182 As a general matter, justice is achieved
when the disputing parties work cooperatively to come to a
consensual agreement that resolves their dispute and restores unity
between the parties and among the greater community. 183
Consensus, resolution, and cooperation are best achieved not
through coercion, but by using a peacemaker who has the mutual
respect of the parties and who can serve as a guide in the
process. 184 The peacemaker guides the process using a variety of
techniques, including emphasizing the common ground shared by
the parties, such as shared tribal traditions and beliefs. 185
b. Principal Values
The peacemaking process reflects a distinct set of values.
Primary emphasis is placed on the restoration of community
solidarity and harmony between the parties. 186 Peacemaking,
unlike the adversary system, does not give greater weight to
individual over community affairs. 187 Peacemaking also differs
from the adversary system by valuing the relationship between
parties rather than the individual rights of the parties. In so doing,
the process gives paramount value to reinforcing community and
interpersonal unity instead of individualism. 188
Peacemaking also places greater value on reaching consensus
than on reaching the truth. 189 In this respect, peacemaking lies in
sharp contrast to the adversary system. Examining the subjects
covered during peacemaker discussions reveals how building
consensus between parties and community members is of critical
importance to the peacemaking process. As an initial matter, while
the individual disputants discuss their understanding of the facts of
the dispute during peacemaking, peacemaking discussions, unlike
182
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adversary adjudication, do not revolve solely around the
disputants’ differing interests and factual accounts of the dispute.
Throughout the peacemaking process, the peacemaker offers
insight into how the dispute implicates Navajo stories or traditions
and seeks to point out where the disputants have common
ground. 190 As a result, a substantial part of the substance of
peacemaking focuses on what the disputants share, rather than on
their divergent interests. 191
Additionally, unlike the adversary system, peacemaking does
not consider solely the objective facts of a dispute. 192 Peacemaking
recognizes and addresses the emotional dimensions of conflict, as
well. 193 The peacemaking process recognizes that emotions and
feelings are just as important as logic and reasoning rather than
ignoring the emotional needs of disputants like the adversarial
system. 194 Often, parties’ emotions play an important role in
peacemaking, as it is often the parties’ expressions of their feelings
from which the peacemaker discerns the true cause of conflict. 195
Furthermore, expression of emotions and feelings enables both
participants in the peacemaking to understand the full
consequences of their actions. 196
c. Underlying Assumptions
Like the adversary system, peacemaking proceeds according to
a number of assumptions about the nature of humans and the
nature of human societies. A fundamental assumption underlying
the peacemaking system is that individuals benefit from a system
that focuses on relationships between individuals rather than on the
actual individual. Navajo peacemaking places greater value on
restoring relationships rather than restoring an individual’s ability
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to exercise his rights. 197 Consequently, in terms of how to provide
maximum benefit to individuals and society, the assumptions upon
which the adversary and peacemaking systems rely are inversely
related. While the adversary system relies on the proposition that
providing benefit to an individual will benefit the community, the
peacemaking system relies on the assumption that benefits to
collective humans will ultimately benefit the individual.
A second and closely related assumption inherent in the
peacemaking system is that Navajo tribal members do not exist as
autonomous agents. Instead, peacemaking assumes that individuals
are bonded to one another through “solidarity.” 198 The Navajo
understanding of “solidarity” recognizes that an individual exists at
one with his physical environment, family, community, and the
cosmos. 199 Peacemaking is a critical process to the Navajo as it
restores good relations among people. 200
A third assumption underlying the peacemaking process is that
humans are dynamic creatures, motivated by a number of forces,
and capable of engaging in cooperative behavior at the expense of
their own self-interests. In contrast to the adversary system, which
assumes that humans are motivated solely by a desire to maximize
their own self-interest, 201 the peacemaker system contemplates a
much more dynamic ideal of what it means to be human.
Peacemaking operates by fostering cooperation rather than
competition. 202 The operation of the system depends entirely on
the idea that humans can be motivated by a desire to cooperate and
compromise with another person, rather than solely by competition
and winning. Additionally, peacemaking assumes that human
feelings are motivators of human behavior. This is demonstrated
by the fact that a necessary part of peacemaking involves the
participants sharing their feelings about the dispute. 203
Peacemaking also rests on the assumption that people can be
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motivated by respect for others, as the peacemaker is expected to
facilitate the resolution of the dispute in the absence of legal
authority over the disputing parties. 204
d. Collateral Effects
The methods of operation, narrative, values, and assumptions
associated with peacemaking collectively create a number of
additional features that characterize the peacemaking process.
These include the system’s accessibility and the absence of
lawyers; 205 the creation of win-win solutions; 206 strengthening of
Navajo communities; 207 and the establishment of a horizontal
justice system, or a system of justice that does not rely on
hierarchies of power to influence human behavior and in which no
person is above another person. 208
In comparison to the adversary adjudication process,
peacemaking has become an incredibly accessible method for
resolving certain kinds of disputes. 209 This difference in
accessibility can be attributed to a number of factors. First,
comprehension of the rules governing the peacemaking procedures
and goals does not demand a law degree. The peacemaking rules
are written in both plain language and legalese. 210 As such, the
rules are designed to inform and educate people about the process
and its availability. Second, unlike adversary adjudication, there
are no court costs associated with peacemaking. The process
requires only that the parties pay to the peacemaker thirty dollars
for the peacemaker’s time. 211 Third, except for a few narrow
circumstances, the process prohibits the use of lawyers. 212
Peacemaking relies on the parties’ cooperation and consensus
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building, which requires the parties to directly communicate with
one another about personal matters. 213
Moreover, unlike the adversary system, which always results in
a win-lose outcome, the peacemaking process often becomes a
non-zero-sum game. That is, participants frequently devise creative
win-win solutions. 214 This is largely a function of the flexibility
and relational equality that is built into the peacemaking
process. 215
The peacemaking rules intentionally omit reference to how
peacemaking must be performed. 216 Because there is no set
procedure governing how parties must come to a solution, the
parties are able to discuss a number of different alternative
solutions to the dispute. 217 Further, because the participants and the
peacemakers are equals, and because disputants’ family and
friends are permitted to give their input throughout the process,
peacemaking frequently involves a large group of minds
collectively searching for a solution that will benefit everyone
involved. Finally, because peacemaking is based on Navajo
traditions and customs and does not involve the application of
fixed laws to the facts of the dispute, there is no one right answer
to the question posed by the dispute. Removing the requirement
that the dispute must be resolved with certainty, correctness, and
according to precedent allows the parties to the peacemaking an
unlimited number of options when devising solutions.
Another collateral effect of the peacemaking process is that it
has positively impacted the Navajo communities in two major
ways. First, the peacemaking process often strengthens and
restores the relationship between the disputing parties. 218 Unlike
the adversary system, in which the parties never attempt to repair
their relationship, a primary goal of peacemaking is to resolve and
end the parties’ conflict. Second, Navajo tradition and customs are
protected and reinforced through peacemaking as a result of their
213
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use in resolving disputes. 219 Peacemakers often seek to guide
parties to common ground by initiating discussions about Navajo
beliefs or traditions the parties share. In doing this, the peacemaker
reminds everyone participating in the peacemaking of Navajo
customs. 220 The collective effects of the many annual
peacemakings are a strengthening of the Navajo knowledge of and
appreciation for the Nation’s customs. 221
Finally, peacemaking operates as a horizontal justice system,
meaning that it is grounded in equality between the participants. 222
In peacemaking, the parties are not given authority over the
peacemaker or each other. 223 Likewise, the peacemaker has no
legal authority over the parties and cannot force them to resolve
their dispute. 224 Furthermore, while parties have the option to have
the Navajo District Court certify their peacemaking agreements as
judgments carrying the force of law, most parties opt not to involve
the court. 225 Instead, they choose to honor the peacemaking
resolution in the absence of official legal enforcement. In
peacemaking, the importance of group solidarity, and respect for
the peacemaker take the place of the force and coercion employed
by the adversary system. 226
IV. DUELING DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS AND COMPLEX
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS THEORY
A. Two Distinct Dispute Resolution Systems
Peacemaking and adversarial litigation are the two widely
divergent dispute resolution processes that Indian tribes use to
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resolve interpersonal civil disputes today. 227 While peacemaking
has been gaining popularity in recent years, the majority of
disputes on reservations are still resolved in tribal courts pursuant
to some version of the Anglo-American adversary method. 228
Some contemporary scholars, however, have advanced strong
policy arguments supporting the conclusion that peacemaking,
rather than the adversarial tradition employed in tribal courts,
should be the primary mechanism by which tribal members resolve
conflict. 229 The crux of the argument supporting a peacemaking
preference is the fact that peacemaking strengthens
communities. 230 Advocates of the process assert that tribal
communities are benefited by using a dispute resolution system
that promotes values such as community wellbeing and the
importance of relational harmony. 231 Additionally, scholars argue
that utilization of the adversary system promotes values, such as
individualism and autonomy, that are not only antithetical to tribal
values, but that also undermine a tribe’s sense of community and
general wellbeing. 232
While some scholars argue that the adversarial system eats
away at tribal communities, other scholars argue that the key to
strengthening tribal communities is strengthening the AngloAmerican justice procedures utilized by tribal courts. These
scholars posit that the sovereignty of tribal communities depends
on state and federal courts recognizing tribal court decisions. 233
Demonstrating greater fidelity to the Anglo-American legal
practices will give tribal courts the legitimacy they will need in
order to receive the comity necessary for tribal sovereignty. 234 As
such, there are many scholars who support tribal courts’ use of
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Western adversarial legal traditions and propose that the courts
adhere to Anglo-American procedures even more rigidly. 235
Both sides of the debate offer persuasive arguments for their
opposing positions. However, the scholars are not divided on every
issue. Those advocating for greater reliance on peacemaking and
those advocating for stronger Western traditions in tribal courts
share at least one common goal. Both camps aspire to ensure that
tribal dispute resolution systems enhance the wellbeing of tribal
communities. The following part of this article seeks to add insight
to the debate by examining not the policy reflected by preferring a
particular dispute resolution system, but by examining the relative
effectiveness of the peacemaking and adversarial justice systems.
The analysis included in the following section relies on two
basic assumptions. First, it is assumed that the wellbeing of tribal
communities is affected not only by the policy furthered in
choosing to prefer a specific dispute resolution system, but also by
the effectiveness of the chosen dispute resolution system. In other
words, in order to truly benefit tribal communities, the dispute
resolution system must effectively resolve conflict between tribal
members. Second, it is assumed that the dispute resolution system
that best responds to the dynamics of human social systems, as
defined by scientific theory, will be a more advantageous strategy
for dispute resolution.
Based on these assumptions, the first section of this part first
considers the dynamics governing human social systems as
explained by complex adaptive systems theory. The features and
principles with implications for legal systems are also explored.
The second section of this part then analyzes the relative
effectiveness of each dispute resolution system in terms of how
each best adapts and responds to human social systems. This part
ultimately concludes that, because the peacemaking system is
better adapted to the workings of human social dynamics,
peacemaking is a more effective and consequently the preferable
method of dispute resolution.
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B. Using Complex Adaptive Systems Theory to Analyze Competing
Dispute Resolution Methods
1. Overview of Complex Adaptive Systems Theory
Complex adaptive systems (CAS) theory is a field of study that
has been used to understand and explain the behavior of a number
of complex phenomenon, from ecosystems to the human immune
system to the weather, all of which are considered “complex
adaptive systems.” 236 Despite their widely divergent natures, CAS
share a number of similar properties and features, and behave
according to the same general dynamics. Like an anthill or the
human brain, groups of humans or human social systems also
function as complex adaptive systems. 237 Consequently, human
social systems exhibit the same organizing principles, dynamics,
and properties as other CAS found throughout the rest of nature. 238
The understanding that human social systems function as CAS
has major implications for a number of fields, especially the law—
specifically, dispute resolution. The subject matter on which the
law acts is human behavior, and, in the case of dispute resolution
laws, it is human conflict. If CAS theory can shed light on the
dynamics and properties of human social systems and the
relationships between the individual human components, then we
can assess the relative effectiveness of dispute resolution
procedures by comparing how well adapted the dispute resolution
system is to the CAS dynamics of human societies. Furthermore, it
is safe to assume that a dispute resolution system that fails to
accommodate the nature of the dynamics of human societies,
ultimately will be less effective than a system that does
accommodate the dynamic ways that human systems behave.
An effective way to define complex adaptive systems is to
break apart the words included in the term “complex adaptive
236
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systems.” First, a “system” is anything comprised of two or more
agents that interact. 239 A system is considered a “complex” system
when the system includes a large number of agents that not only
interact with each other, but also exist in interdependent
relationships with one another and their environment. 240
Interdependence means that the agents of the system influence and
are influenced by one another. 241
A complex adaptive system displays two additional properties:
“emergence” and “adaptability.” 242 “Emergence” refers to the
process by which large-scale, system level behaviors emerge as a
result of the self-organization of and relationships between
individual agents. 243 For example, in human systems, political
parties, the economy, and language all constitute “emergent”
behaviors. 244 Systems demonstrate “adaptability” when these
emergent behaviors are capable of actually changing in response
to, or adapting to, stimuli from the environment. 245 The ability of
political parties to change in response to changing social norms,
over the course of time, is an example of an “adaptable emergent”
behavior that human social systems demonstrate.
CAS also share a number of defining characteristics that
separate them from other kinds of systems. As an initial matter,
CAS defy reductionist logic. 246 This means that one cannot attempt
to understand the system by breaking it into its basic component
parts and subsequently studying the behavior of the parts. 247 CAS
are greater than the sum of their parts, and at the whole-system
level exhibit an array of properties that are not expressed by any of
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the component parts. 248 Additionally, one cannot seek to fully
understand the working of a system’s component part by removing
it from the system and studying its behaviors. 249 Any part of the
system can only be understood fully when it is considered along
with the historical, environmental, and social context within which
the part exists. 250
These principles suggest that human societies cannot be
understood by examining the behavior of single individuals.
Consequently, while a single individual may display a wide array
of behaviors, a single individual will never completely capture the
breadth of behaviors exhibited by the system itself. They also
suggest that a single human being likely cannot be understood
outside of the context of the relationships within which the human
being exists. The human’s behavior is largely defined as a result of
social and environmental relationships and constraints. To
understand the operation and behavior of a single human, the
human must be studied in relation to its environmental and social
context. Finally, the principles indicate that conflict, itself, cannot
be understood when it is separated from the historical,
environmental, and social context in which it arose.
A second feature of CAS is that they are highly unpredictable
as a result of the non-linear relationships between their component
parts. 251 CAS are comprised of diverse component parts interacting
in a diverse array of relationships, responding to one another and
their environment. 252 The complexity of the interactions involved
in CAS renders the system subject to non-linear dynamics and
unpredictability. 253 Non-linearity means that small changes to the
system at the component level can yield disproportionately large
changes within the system at the system level. 254 Because of
CAS’s non-linearity, the system’s long-term behavior is inherently
unpredictable. 255
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That human social systems exhibit non-linear and
unpredictable dynamics has important legal implications,
especially for dispute resolution. The unpredictability of human
social systems suggests that dispute resolution systems should
remain flexible and adaptable in order to respond to unexpected
behavior from human subjects. 256 Additionally, given the inherent
unpredictability in complex human social systems, laws and
policies should not be based on the assumption that human systems
can always be governed effectively by rigid sets of rules. 257
Another notable feature is that CAS are comprised of a large
number of diverse semi-autonomous component parts, and the
resiliency of the system itself is a function of the relationships
among its individual component parts. 258 In order for CAS to be
sufficiently adaptable to maintain its existence in the face of
environmental disturbances, there must be sufficiently close
relationships among the system’s component parts. 259 This
principle suggests that for human systems, social cohesion and the
quality of relationships between individuals directly impacts the
ability of human communities to survive external disruptions or
change.
A final feature of CAS is that they actually are strengthened
through disturbance and change. 260 Internal and external change or
disturbance is inherent in the operation of the system, and
responding to disturbance results in increasing the system’s
resiliency and adaptability in the face of even greater change. 261
Consequently, the introduction of disturbance or change within a
system is actually beneficial to the system. 262 The implication for
human systems of this CAS characteristic is that internal and
external conflict that disturbs human social systems is not
necessarily an aberrant phenomenon that should be viewed
negatively or with surprise. Instead, conflict among individuals
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within a social system is to be continually expected and resolved
on an ongoing basis.
2. Application of CAS Theory to the Adversary and Peacemaking
Systems
When using systems theory to analyze the relative
effectiveness of peacemaking versus the Western adversarial
approach to dispute resolution, a clear pattern emerges:
peacemaking is better adapted to the complex, adaptive social
dynamics of human societies, and as such, peacemaking is likely
more capable of serving as an effective dispute resolution system
than the Western adversarial tradition. Peacemaking is better
equipped to deal with the dynamics of human social systems for a
number of reasons.
First, peacemaking approaches conflict and the individuals
involved from a holistic rather than reductionist standpoint. 263 As
such, peacemaking more effectively evaluates conflict and what is
needed for consensual resolution. For example, peacemaking
allows anyone who has an interest in a conflict to be a party to a
peacemaking. 264 As a result, family members and close friends of
disputants routinely participate in the process. 265 Peacemaking
approaches conflict holistically by including all of the parties who
are affected by a conflict, and by ensuring that all of the
repercussions of the main conflict are considered when coming to a
resolution, even if these repercussions were felt by those other than
actual disputants. The Western adversarial system is just the
opposite, as it allows only those immediately affected by the
conflict to participate in the litigation. 266 Excluding everyone other
than the parties directly involved simplifies the conflict. It also
approaches resolution of the entire conflict by considering only a
fractional representation of the parties affected by the conflict.
Because the effects of the conflict are never fully apprehended, the
263

Smith, supra note 178, at 344-45.
Metoui, supra note 17, at 530.
265
Id.
266
Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Fact-finding, 61 Duke L. J. 1, 3-4 (2011).
264

2016]

Complex Adaptive Peacemaking

304

solution devised by the adversary system likely fails to completely
resolve the original problem.
Another way that peacemaking reflects holistic thinking is the
essentially limitless scope of issues that can be considered when
resolving a dispute. 267 Parties to a peacemaking are permitted to
discuss anything they need to discuss in order to resolve a dispute
and often engage in dialogues that would otherwise be excluded in
an adversarial context. 268 Furthermore, in peacemaking all
contributing factors to the conflict including environmental, social,
and historical factors, are examined to address the underlying
issues that precipitated the problem. 269 In addition, the mental,
spiritual, and emotional well-being of all of the participants is
addressed. 270
Western adversarial litigation, on the other hand, takes an
entirely different approach to conflict. The adversarial system
breaks conflict down into fragmented component legal parts and
addresses solely the legal aspects of a dispute. 271 Adversarial
litigation also largely excludes the historical and contextual
evidence framing the dispute. 272 The adversary system approaches
conflict by removing it from the context in which it arises, and by
breaking it into smaller pieces in order to understand its larger
whole. This approach is quintessentially reductionist. Again,
because conflict is a part of a complex adaptive human social
system that cannot be understood through reductionist methods,273
the adversary system fails to properly assess the problem. As a
result, it is likely not as effective at finding an effective solution.
Peacemaking is also better adapted than the adversarial system
to dispute resolution in complex human systems, because
peacemaking accounts for the fact that individual human behaviors
and relationship dynamics are often unpredictable. Peacemaking
accommodates this reality by employing flexible procedures for
the dispute resolution process that allow for whatever tangential
267
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discussions and creative solutions are required to reach the
resolution between the parties. 274 Conversely, the adversarial
system follows extensive and rigid procedural and evidentiary
rules that define every aspect of the dispute resolution process. 275
This rigid order often comes at the expense of allowing the parties
to fully explore what they need to resolve their dispute, because
often what the parties need cannot be precisely predicted at the
outset. Because the flexibility inherent in peacemaking makes the
process capable of responding to the unpredictability of human
social systems and individual human behavior, peacemaking is
better able to adjust to meet the evolving needs of the participating
parties necessary for reaching a consensual solution.
Another way peacemaking is better adapted to the dynamics of
human social systems is that peacemaking, unlike the adversary
system, functions not to vindicate individual rights, but rather to
restore relationships. 276 CAS theory has established that a system’s
ability to endure requires sufficiently close relationships among a
system’s component parts. 277 The resiliency and adaptability of
human social systems to withstand change and continue thriving is
directly related to the cohesion between the systems parts 278–i.e.
the relationships among the humans in the social system.
Peacemaking focuses on restoring these relationships, first and
foremost. Conversely, the adversarial method never actually
aspires to resolve the conflict between the parties. Instead,
resolving the interpersonal conflict between the parties is an
afterthought to the primary goal of determining and validating the
legal rights of the parties to the dispute. 279
One final way in which peacemaking is more adapted to the
dynamics of human social systems is the fact that dynamic change
and conflict inherent in social systems, and actually, at reasonable
levels, make communities stronger. The adversarial system is not
adapted to the fact that conflict is inherent in CAS, and the fact that
274
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the continual resolution of disturbance within a CAS makes the
CAS more resilient in the long run. This is demonstrated by the
adversarial system’s inaccessibility, which has the effect of making
the process completely unattainable by parties whose conflict often
goes unresolved. 280 While there is no principle in the adversarial
system that directly denies access to the courts, the courts today are
far more inaccessible than peacemaking. Because peacemaking is
so simple, inexpensive, and accessible to the average person, 281 it
is a dispute resolution system capable of handling the dynamic and
ongoing change that is inherent in human complex adaptive
systems.
A pattern emerges when using CAS theory as a lens through
which to analyze and assess the adversarial and peacemaking
dispute resolution systems. Traditional peacemaking methods, such
as those employed by the Navajo Nation, are far better adapted
than the adversarial system to the complexity of human social
systems. Given its superior adaptability to human social dynamics,
it is reasonable to conclude that peacemaking processes are more
successful than Western adversarial processes at resolving
interpersonal disputes. Given its greater effectiveness,
peacemaking can likely provide benefits to tribal communities that
employment of the adversarial system cannot.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the greatest assimilationist feats of the United States
was to inculcate Anglo-American legal traditions such as
adversarial litigation in tribal justice systems. Despite this
influence, many tribes have retained or reintroduced traditional
dispute resolution methods, or peacemaking, as a part of their
current legal practices when resolving interpersonal disputes
among tribal members. 282 Tribes utilizing both peacemaking and
adversarial litigation have dual justice systems that reflect largely
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divergent values and assumptions. 283 Although peacemaking is
gaining momentum, tribes still employ the Western adversarial
system more frequently when resolving disputes between
members. 284 While scholars have weighed in on the desirability of
continuing to use adversarial practices in tribal courts, the
effectiveness of each system must also be considered when
assessing which dispute resolution model to primarily rely.
Because traditional peacemaking is better adapted to human social
dynamics, peacemaking is likely more effective at restoring
relationships and resolving interpersonal conflict. Given the
importance of utilizing the most effective dispute resolution system
when resolving interpersonal civil disputes among tribal members,
peacemaking could possibly provide greater benefits to tribal
communities than utilization of the adversarial system.
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